Collective bargaining structure in the US is, essentially, a "decentralized, plant-level activity" (Towers 303). As trade unions have grown weaker, the bargaining power has shifted toward employers, as the decentralized nature of collective bargaining would tend to indicate (Towers 303). However, it can also be argued that the National Labor Relations Act (the Wagner Act) actually encourages decentralization of plant-level bargaining (Towers 303). This system of "structural-legislative imperative" has produced a number of consequences (Towers 303). First of all, …
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